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Abstract: Although the legal issues related to sexual autonomy and sexual offending are significantly
different, the resistance to providing adequate and effective counsel and the employment of the
vividness heuristic (to privilege anecdote and reject valid and reliable research) is similar in both
cases. The past forty years has seen an explosion of interest in mental disability law, and a significant
expansion of rights for the population of persons with mental disabilities, both in institutions and the
community, during which the society has witnessed a revolution in American mental disability law.
It saw the first broad-based, federal civil rights statutes enacted on behalf of persons with mental
disabilities. It witnessed the creation of a "patients' bar" to provide legal representation to such
persons. But this revolution largely bypassed persons seeking to argue for sexual autonomy and
seeking to apply procedural and substantive due process to matters involving invocation of the
sexually violent predator status. However, at the same time that all this happened, another parallel
set of developments has had a profound application on mental disability law-on case law, statutes,
administrative regulations and lawyers' roles. The expansion of the school of legal analysis known as
therapeutic jurisprudence has caused scholars to reconsider many of the basic principles of this area
of law, and it is critical that any analysis of mental disability law take the insights of this area seriously.
The question we address in this paper is this: although there has been a general "revolution" in
mental disability law, there are those whom it has not affected. To what extent does the law that
governs sexual autonomy and that governs matters involving alleged sexually violent predators
comport with these therapeutic jurisprudence principles? This paper considers that question.
Keywords: mental disability law; sexual autonomy; patients' rights; sexual offenders
One of the co-authors (M.L.P.) began a recent article (with another co-author) in this manner:
"In this paper, we address a question that has been raised to each of us innumerable times since we
began to practice law: 'How can you possibly represent to the court what your client is asking for?"
That article dealt with the responsibilities on counsel to ethically articulate their clients' positions on
matters involving mental health treatment, even if that position was not the same as the one that
counsel would have selected. In that article, we noted that a typical example might be, "how can
you argue that your client has a right to sexual interaction?" 2 In other articles and a book, two of the
co-authors (M.L.P & H.E.C) have written about counsel's profound ambivalence in representation
of persons alleged to be sexually violent predators.3 Although the legal issues in these two areas of
1 Peri and Weistin (2016).
2 Id. at 75. Two of the co-authors (M.L.P. & A.J.L.) have explored this issue extensively. See e.g., Perlin and Lynch (2016);
Perlin a Ln (2015), Four-Letter Word; Perlin and Lynch (2014), Sexless Patients.
See e.g., Per n and Cuco (2017a); Cucolo and Perlin (2015).
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law-sexual autonomy and sexual offending-are significantly different, the resistance to providing
adequate and effective counsel and the employment of the vividness heuristic (to privilege anecdote
and reject valid and reliable research)4 is similar in both cases.5
The past forty years has seen an "explosion of interest" in mental disability law,6 and a significant
expansion of rights for the population of persons with mental disabilities, both in institutions and the
community.7 One of the co-authors (M.L.P.) put it starkly this way 15 years ago:
The past thirty years have witnessed a revolution in American mental disability law.
This revolution is one that largely constitutionalized virtually every aspect of the
involuntary civil commitment and release process, as well as most "pressure points" in the
course of institutionalization (the right to treatment, the right to refuse treatment, the right
to the least restrictive alternative course of treatment). It saw the first broad-based, federal
civil rights statutes enacted on behalf of persons with mental disabilities. It witnessed the
creation of a "patients' bar" to provide legal representation to such persons.8
But this revolution largely bypassed persons seeking to argue for sexual autonomy and seeking to
apply procedural and substantive due process to matters involving invocation of the sexually violent
predator status. By way of example, the treatment standards established in the historic institutional
right to treatment case of Wyatt v. Stickney9-the first broad-based law reform case granting a right
to treatment to institutionalized psychiatric patientso-guaranteed such individuals the right to
reasonable interaction with members of the opposite sex." Of the many states that adopted the Wyatt
standards as bases of their Patients' Bills of Rights, however, only four adopted this portion of the
standards. 12 There has also virtually no follow-up litigation based upon any of the statutes that do
provide for this right, and only a scattering of cases has been litigated anywhere that has sought to
vindicate this right.13
People with mental disabilities, who allegedly violate sex act-related laws, often face harsh
consequences that fail to account for disability. For example, individuals who are civilly committed
to facilities for sexually violent predators-the most despised members of society 1 -regularly face
a lifetime of maximum security confinement (often without the benefit of counsel or a jury trial
prior to this institutionalization),15 as a result of the Supreme Court's pretextual decision in Kansas
v. Hendricks,16 enforcing social control in punitive ways under the guise of the beneficence of civil
commitment.17 Although a diagnosis of a mental disability is a necessary component of the civil
commitment statute, actual treatment falls short of properly addressing the issues.18 Scholars and
4 The vividness heuristic is the cognitive-simplifying device through which a "single vivid, memorable case overwhelms
mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be made" (Perlin 1997a, p. 1417). (In this context,
one vivid, negative anecdote-perhaps even an apocryphal one with no basis in fact-overwhelms an extensive contrary
statistical database (Perlin 2009, p. 637)).
s This resistance is replicated in the attitudes of law students. See Perlin and Lynch (2015b, pp. 217-18): The notion that
patients have ... a right [to sexual autonomy]-and that this right may be found in some state patients' bills of rights ...
-strikes many students as incredulous. See also, e.g., Cucolo and Perlin (2013, p. 216) (discussing the widespread belief that
television programs such as Law & Order: SVU-alleging a near 100% recidivism rate among sex offenders-are accurate).
6 See e.g., Perlin and Cucolo (2017b).
7 See id., § 1-2.1.1. For considerations of the major developments since 1990, see id., §§ 12-2.1 to 1-2.2.7.
SPerin (22)
9 344 E Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 E2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
10 Perlin and Cucolo (2017b), supra note 6, §§ 7-3.1 to 7-3.1.15.
n Wyatt, 344 E Supp. at 381.
12 See Perin (1997b, pp. 947, 965); Perlin and Lynch (2016), supra note 2, at 29-30.
13 See, e.g., Gary W. V. Louisiana, 437 E Supp. 1209, 1228-29 (E.D. La. 1976) (following Wyatt); Davis v. Watkins, 384 E Supp.
1196, 1206 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (following Wyatt).
14 >Gaghty (2007).
1 See Perlin and Cucolo (2017b), supra note 6, §§ 5-4.6 to 5-4.7.
16 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding that a Sexually Violent Predator Act is constitutional even though additional confinement
follows prison time). See generally, Perlin (1998).
17 erlin (2003, pp. 199-200).
' See generally, Lindsay (2003) (citing lack of sexual knowledge and social skills as a cause of sex offending behavior).
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legislators must be cognizant of the presence of disability, and understand how it influences behavior.
An awareness and understanding of these issues will allow for better effective strategies in public
safety rehabilitation.
We have chosen in this article to discuss these two seemingly-disparate questions together, as we
believe that society's responses to the issues raised flow from similar attitudes-about sexuality and
disability-and that "twinning" developments in these areas may give us some insights to the roots of
these attitudes and to potential means of remediation.
At the same time that all this happened in these areas of law, another parallel set of developments
has had a profound application on all aspects of mental disability law-on case law, statutes,
administrative regulations and lawyers' roles. The expansion of the school of legal analysis known as
therapeutic jurisprudence has caused scholars to reconsider many of the basic principles of this area of
law, and it is critical that any analysis of mental disability law take the insights of this area seriously.19
Therapeutic jurisprudence "look[s] at law as it actually impacts people's lives" 20 and assesses
law's influence on "emotional life and psychological well-being." 21 It mandates that "law should
value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever
possible, and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about healing
and wellness." 22 Its ultimate aim is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles
can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process
principles. 23
It embodies what Professor Amy Ronner has characterized as "the three Vs"-voice, validation
and voluntariness:24
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a
chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has
genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a
sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice
and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a
sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as
less coercive. 25
The question, then, to be asked is this: although there has been a general "revolution" in mental
disability law, there are those whom it has not affected. To what extent does the law that governs
sexual autonomy and that governs matters involving alleged sexually violent predators comport with
these therapeutic jurisprudence principles? And how might a focus on therapeutic jurisprudence offer
some remediation? It is to these questions we turn next.
1. Patients' Rights: Competency and Sexual Autonomy
An article published in early 2014 in a peer-reviewed scientific journal began with a startling
comment: "The recognition that individuals with disabilities have a desire for sexual relationships with




23 Perlin (2003, p, 751). For an important recent paper emphasizing the necessary integral relationship between therapeutic
jurisprudence and due process, see Stobbs (2017).
24 Ronner (2008). Certainly, in the context of the topic of this paper, these factors must be considered along with issues such
as public safety and individual welfare, but we believe that the basic precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence still control.
See generally, Birgden and Perlin (2008). See also e.g., Dickie (2008, p. 460) ("The TJ Model allows for a more therapeutic
approach to managing criminal behavior in which all invested parties, including psychologists, lawyers, and correctional
officers can balance the rights of the offenders against public safety").
25 Ronner (2002, pp. 94-95) (internal citations omitted).
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other people is a relatively new concept in the scientific community." 26 This observation-wildly at
odds with much of the literature in the field 27-exemplifies the confusion and misinformation that
permeates this area of law and policy. The baseline, rather, for any scholarly inquiry into this subject,
must be that "individuals [with disabilities] have the same needs for intimate relationships and sexual
expression as everyone else." 28
With the growth in the field of mental disability law over the past 50 years, very few topics
involving persons with mental illness remain taboo or off limits to scholars and judges facing these
issues daily. However, discussions of the question of whether persons with mental disabilities have a
right to voluntary sexual interaction often touches a raw nerve in conversations about mental disability
law even with those who are practicing in the field, The discomfort that people feel in examining
this topic is further exacerbated when discussing individuals who are institutionalized. Our attitudes
toward the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities can often be divided into two categories, at
odds with each other and with our understanding of the importance of human sexuality and autonomy
to engage in consensual sexual activity:
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs of the mentally disabled.
Alternatively, they are regarded as possessing an animalistic hypersexuality, which
warrants the imposition of special protections and limitations on their sexual behavior to
stop them from acting on these "primitive" urges. By focusing on alleged "differentness",
we deny their basic humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual needs.
By asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow ourselves to censor their feelings
and their actions. By denying their ability to show love and affection, we justify this
disparate treatment.29
All these tensions are heightened in cases involving institutionalized persons, in which patient
desires and provider discomforts must be acknowledged and recalibrated. 30 Although this is often
a difficult subject to raise, even among those familiar and comfortable with other aspects of mental
disability, it is one that must be raised in order to comport with therapeutic jurisprudence, and legal
standards. Dignity concerns and rights violations will occur if there is not a full understanding of the
importance of the ability for persons with mental illness to practice free sexual expression.
In this discussion, it is critical to start with the assumption that all individuals have the capacity
to consent to sexual relations, and that the presence of a mental disorder, in itself, does not mean
that the individual lacks this capacity.31 With this as a "given", it is first necessary to understand the
different modes of analysis to be engaged in determining capacity and competency. Capacity "refers
to an individual's actual ability to understand, appreciate, and form a relatively rational intention with
regard to some act." 32 Competency is a legal assessment that varies based on the act or decisionmaking
that is being considered. 33 Both of these concepts are intertwined in assessing the extent to which a
person can exercise informed consent.
26 Gimo t a . (2014) (emphasis added). Many other issues are raised in the context of individuals with physical disabilities.
See e.g., Bahner (2012) (discussing "intimacy influenced activities" such as genital shaving). By way of example, there has
been some preliminary exploration of the question of the impact of certain physical disabilities on a woman's ability to have
orgasms (p. 347). See e.g., Glass (1999).
27 See Perlin and Lynch (2015), Four-Letter Word, supra note 2.
28 er (2012). Professor Werner's focus was on persons with intellectual disabilities but there is nothing in the literature
that suggests persons with mental illness/psychosocial disabilities are any different in this regard. We use the phrase
"mental disabilities" to encompass both groups.
29 Perin (1993, p. 537). For a subsequent consideration of the impact of this infantilization, see Benedet and Grant (2007).
30 See e.g., Tnnie (2013).
31Mena Wel-are Comm ssion of Scotland (2007).
32 Bising (2007). On why inquiries into capacity are an insufficient basis for decisionmaking about persons with mental
disabilities engaging in sexual interactions, see Dimopolos (2012).
3 See generally, Perlin et al. (2008).
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There is also the difficulty of establishing "clinical" competency, for those persons who are
institutionalized. There is no standard that clinicians can apply when determining competency; in fact,
it is a very fluid determination. In a survey of institutions' views on their ability to handle ethical
concerns of patient sexual expression, author Eric Wright found, "aside from formal legal declarations
of incompetence, establishing competence to engage in sexual activity during treatment is further
complicated by the dynamic nature of psychiatric symptoms, variation in patients' sexuality-related
knowledge and experience, and institutional policies." 34 Moreover, in certain locations, the relationship
between sexuality and privacy is "directly related to assessments about ... competence." 35
The reality is, however, that we too often fail to take any of this into account and instead
superimpose a societal presumption of incompetency,36 a "damaging message" when applied to
any aspects of a person with a mental disability 37 This, more than anything else, leads to the confusion,
dissonance, and tension in this area of law, society, and personhood. This type of presumption is
directly at odds with a therapeutic jurisprudence-based analysis of this issue. The questions that
must be addressed here are these: are persons with mental disabilities given this sort of autonomy
in their sexual decisionmaking? Are Professor Ronner's "3 V's" complied with? Generally, where
incompetency is presumed and individuals who are institutionalized are treated either as asexual or
hypersexual based only on their diagnosis of mental illness, we are far from establishing an ethos of
care that takes into account the importance of sexuality for everyone, and keeps the sensitive nature
of the topic in mind while crafting policies and procedures that empower and educate, rather than
demonize or demoralize this population. 38
2. Sexually Violent Predator Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Are the people before the court in this cohort of cases-the most despised individuals in the
nation-"worthy" of the assignment of counsel, of the right to constitutional amendments, of the right
to a fair trial?39
Currently, no other population in our criminal and civil legal system is more despised, more
vilanized, more subject to media mis-representation and more likely to be denied basic human rights.
Factual evidence regarding this population has been greatly skewed to satisfy political agendas
and community outcries of retribution.40 One of the results of such outcries was the enactment of
a legislative scheme that teetered on the border of civil and criminal law, of which sole purpose
was to indefinitely contain individuals labeled sexual predators. 41 Twenty individual states and the
federal government have enacted laws confining individuals who have been adjudicated as "sexually
violent predators" to civil commitment facilities post incarceration and/or conviction.42 Additionally,
in many jurisdictions, offenders who are returned to the community are restricted and monitored
34 Wig t al. (2012). For a consideration of how institutional living inevitably shapes policies related to masturbation,
see Gill (2012).
3s Id.
36 On similar incorrect presumptions of incompetency in the law, see e.g., Rodham (1973) (presumed incompetency in children);
Lucas (2013) (presumed physical incompetency of pregnant teachers). On how lawyers often impermissibly engage in such
a presumption of incompetency with regard to their institutionalized clients, see Perlin (2008, p. 262). There is no question
that not even a judgment of involuntary commitment can act as an adjudication of incompetency. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN
§30:4-24.2(c).
3 (Best 2 0 12 , p. 488).
38 See e.g., Perlin and Lynch (2014), Sexless Patients, supra note 2; Perlin and lynch (2016), supra note 2.
39 See e.g., Perlin and Cucolo (2017b), supra note 6, §§ 5-4.6 to 5-4.7.
40 See e.g., Cucolo and PerWn (2012).
41 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[nlotwithstanding its civil attributes, the practical effect of the
Kansas law may be to impose confinement for life").
42 Carpenter and Beverlin (2012) (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and the United States (the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 authorized
the federal government to institute a civil commitment program for federal sex offenders (42 U.S.C. § 16971)).
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under community notification, registration and residency limitations.4 3 In more recent years, courts
and scholars have begun to question the constitutionality of the laws and statutes as applied,44 but it
is on with a guaranteed right to quality counsel, that those questions will continue to be effectively
raised in the courts.
Each civil commitment statute has the same basic requirements- a qualifying offense, a current
mental abnormality or personality disorder, the likelihood of committing future acts of sexual violence
and a finding of a nexus between all three. Jurisdictions vary on the availability and constitutionality of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at trial45 and although securing a constitutional right to counsel
in civil commitment is an initial step, it is crucial that we not merely consider the right to counsel but
discuss that right in combination with the quality of counsel and counsel's resources and knowledge in
this area of the law. Effective counsel in these proceedings must be able to combat unique and complex
challenges, including, for instance, the chilling effect on vigorous representation of such a despised
population, and the effect of the legal process on the individual.
Thus, to what extent can therapeutic jurisprudence better inform legal practices to insure that
adequate counsel is provided in consideration of Professor Ronner's principles of voluntariness,
voice and validation? 46
Although it may appear that the principles behind voluntariness and voice are difficult to maintain
when they are weighed with the ultimate goal of public safety,47 we believe that voice and voluntariness
need not be adverse to the goals of public safety. 4 8 The public policy approach to sex offender
treatment which is currently treatment-as-management (deterrence and community rights) undermines
treatment-as-rehabilitation (autonomy and offender rights).49 Understanding and helping to reduce
the impact of the harms of that arise out of the civil commitment process can benefit the individual
and decrease the potential for recidivism.50 A primary focus on deterrence and community rights
can lead to future unemployment, homelessness, shame, depression and anxiety, disconnection from
social supports, and inadequate treatment-outcomes that have been shown to increase potential for
recidivism. 51 Persons in sex offender civil commitment are often denied their basic privacy rights,
leading to feelings of infantilization. 52 The conditions under which they live reinforce the knowledge
of compromised social status and stigmatized social role as pariahs of the communtity.53
Even the simple act of having a zealous advocate can offer the client a sense of self-worth
and personal value. Sexual violent predator litigation requires lawyers to be able to understand,
contextualize and effectively cross-examine and rebut their adversary's position. Even a cursory
examination of cases litigated on the right to counsel issue demonstrates the demand for a TJ
approach to representation and to litigation.5 4 Lawyers must continue to compel the court to
4 See generally, Cucolo and Perlin (2013), supra note 5, at 218.
4 See generally, Perlin and Cucolo (2017b), supra note 6, Chapter 5.
4 Commitment of Dodge, 989 N.E.2d 1159 (Ill. App. 2013) (although proceedings governing a petition alleging that a
defendant is a "sexually violent person" under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act are civil in nature, the Act
provides a defendant with the right to effective assistance of counsel as provided in Strickland).
46 Ronner (2002), supra note 25, at 94-95.
47 But see Birgden and Perlin (2008), supra note 24, and Dickie (2008), supra note 24.
48 See e.g., King (2008): Therapeutic jurisprudence has suggested reforms to minimise the law's negative effects on wellbeing and to
promote its wellbeing-related goals such as crime victims' safety and health, injured workers' rehabilitation and broken families' welfare.
49 See Birgden and Cu co (2011).
50 Id. (Treatment-as management has anti-therapeutic consequences that increase the risk to re-offend).
5 See e.g., Cucolo and Prin (2012), supra note 40, at 2. On how shame-based policies violate therapeutic jurisprudence,
see Perlin and Weinstein (2014). On how they do this in a sex offender-specific context, see Cucolo andPerlin (2017).
52 See Duwe (2013
5 Id.
54 For a comprehensive consideration of state-by-state practices, see (NDAA 2012). See generally, In re Detention of Bailey,
740 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App.Ct.2000) (present commitment proceedings were civil in nature and thus were not improperly
used by state to subject offender to greater punishment than was imposed pursuant to plea bargain). In re Detention
of Campbell, 986 P.2d 771 (Wash. App. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1125 (2001) (explaining that because civil
commitment is not criminal punishment, it was not a foregone conclusion that respondent would be civilly committed,
thus commitment, like sex offender registration, is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty and does not violate the plea
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reject unconstitutional procedures and punitive measures that have not been found to reduce
recidivism.55 Further, lawyers need to be educated in not only courtroom strategies but treatment
and care strategies as well. For instance, if counsel were to be familiar with such approaches as
the Risk-Needs-Responsibility Model or the Good Lives model 56-embodying approaches that go
"beyond the legalistic skills of the lawyers" 57-the TJ value of "zealous counseling" might be better
served.58 In particular the Good Lives model: (1) conceptualizes dynamic risk factors merely as "red
flags" indicating human needs are being met in anti-social rather than pro-social ways; (2) provides a
positive strength-based approach to sex offenders in viewing them as interdependent and so reliant
on the good will of others to support them; (3) outlines the skills and capacities necessary to enhance
treatment readiness; and (4) explicitly addresses practitioner attitudes toward offenders and the impact
upon the therapeutic alliance. 59
3. Conclusions
Developments in these two areas of the law reflect societal fears and unease about the relationships
between disability and sexuality, whether that relationship is "positive" (sexual autonomy) or
"negative" (sexual offending). Both the law and social attitudes about both these topics-sexual
autonomy and sexual offending-reject the basic therapeutic jurisprudence principles. If TJ counsels
us-as it does-that the law should value and promote an "ethic of care," 60 then it is clear that
sexuality and sexual offending law fails miserably Certainly, the "voice" required in Professor Ronner's
formulation of TJ is missing.61 Our prejudices and our fears-both spoken and unspoken-dominate
this area of law and policy; 62 and it is essential we confront this as we approach these issues if the
"revolution" in domestic American mental disability law that began in the early 1970s 63 is to have any
reality for the cohorts of individuals we discuss here.
Author Contributions: The three co-authors participated equally in the creation of and writing of this paper.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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